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1Abstract
In this paper we reconstruct the non-residential capital stock of South Korea and Taiwan
based on long-term series of investment in non-residential buildings and machinery and
equipment. Secondly, we looked at the impact of capital input measures, using a stock as a
well a flow measure of capital, on total factor productivity growth. Finally, to assess the
potential for continued catch-up of the emerging economies towards productivity levels of the
more advanced countries, we analyse capital-output ratios and the change in comparative
levels of capital intensity and labour productivity.
For both countries we find a rapid growth of the capital stock for the total economy and for
manufacturing, with growth rates that peaked between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. In
particular with capital inputs measured in terms of service flows, total factor productivity
growth is low up to the mid 1980s. Since then TFP growth slightly improved which is related
to the slowdown of labour input growth. Capital-output ratios continued to rise for the total
economy. For manufacturing we found a strong rise in capital-output ratios in particular since
the 1980s.
In terms of comparative levels, there are still large gaps between the two East Asian countries
and the USA in terms of capital-labour ratios and labour productivity. This indicates that
despite the diminishing returns to capital goods, especially in manufacturing, opportunities
for further growth on basis of accumulation are still far from exhausted. This remaining
catch-up potential ought to be realised by complementing capital accumulation with
productivity growth.
JEL codes: Macroeconomics, Growth and Fluctations (N1); Economic Development (O1);
Technological Change (O3), Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity (O4)
21. Introduction
Well before the start of the recent financial and economic crisis in Asia, a vigorous debate
emerged about the factors behind the real growth performance of East and Southeast Asia
since the 1960s and the barriers to further growth. Originally the debate revolved around the
question whether the typical neo-classical factors, i.e. those that limit the role of governments
and strengthen that of markets in reallocating resources to their most efficient use, or that
interventionist measures, i.e. those that regulate financial markets and impose
industrialisation policies, have explained the region’s exceptional growth performance. In
1993 the World Bank  further complicated the debate by introducing a “market friendly”
approach as a way to blend aspects of the neo-classical and revisionist viewpoints (World
Bank, 1993).
More recently the debate has become more focused around the question whether the
accumulation of capital in Asia was so rapid that the growth process became typically
extensive, and that future growth is likely to slow down because of diminishing returns to
capital (Krugman, 1994). Indeed some scholars report rapid accumulation in combination
with low total factor productivity growth in Asia  (Kim and Lau, 1994; Young, 1992, 1994,
1995), but others emphasise that despite rapid accumulation TFP growth in East Asia has
been quite respectable when compared to other developing regions in the world (Nehru and
Dhareshwar, 1994; Sarel, 1995; Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Nadiri and Son, 1997; Timmer,
1999). In a recent paper, Easterly and Levine (1999) argue that it is TFP growth rather than
capital accumulation which accounts for a substantial amount of cross-country differences in
per capita income. Others again argue that the production function approach, which underlies
this growth accounting work, is inappropriate as the distinction between capital accumulation
and total factor productivity cannot be made and hides the fundamental driving factor behind
growth, i.e. the search process to master new capital goods and substitute capital for labour
(Nelson and Pack, 1999). Also, the recent literature on endogenous growth suggests that the
returns on capital may be higher than assumed in the Solow production function because of
spillovers. For example, the surge of foreign inflows of capital in emerging markets in the
1990s has rekindled new interest in foreign investment as a source of important spillovers to
domestic capital (Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford, 1996; De Mello, 1997;
Borenzstein et al, 1998).
Much of this debate has lacked clarity for several reasons, three of which are addressed in
this paper. The first is related to the measurement of the domestic capital stock; the second to
measuring the contribution of capital to total factor productivity growth; and the third to
assessing the evidence on diminishing returns to capital in relation to the remaining catch-up
potential for growth in the emerging economies.
3Lack of reliable data in combination with the sensitivity of the procedures seriously limits the
number of countries for which one can derive reliable estimates of the domestic capital stock
(Nehru and Dhareshwar, 1993; Sarel, 1997). As a result many studies, in particular those that
made use of cross-country regressions, have used investment-output ratios as a proxy for the
change in the capital stock. This procedure assumes that marginal and average capital-output
ratios are the same. A recent study by Fukuda and Toya has emphasised that this assumption
is particularly unrealistic for East and Southeast Asian countries which are characterised by
relatively low capital-output ratios in combination with high rates of capital accumulation
(Fukuda and Toya, 1999).
Those scholars that constructed capital stock estimates reverted to different procedures.
Essentially, two basic methods are available, namely wealth surveys which value the capital
stock in place at user value, and estimates based on the perpetual inventory method (PIM)
which are obtained by cumulating investment data using assumptions concerning the life time
of assets and the depreciation pattern. The latter approach has been applied in two
international datasets that aimed to include as many countries as possible, namely the World
Bank dataset on physical capital (Nehru and Dhareshwar, 1993) and the Penn World Tables
(Summers and Heston, 1991). The series from both datasets involve very substantial
measurement problems, as the estimates are either based on indirect procedures, such as
using investment/GDP ratios (Penn World Tables) or rough methods to derive a reliable
benchmark estimates for the stock (World Bank dataset).1
Section 2 of this paper concentrates on capital stock estimates for two East Asian countries
with extraordinary rapid economic growth over the past decades, namely the Republic of
Korea and the Republic of China, Taiwan Area.2 We review existing estimates based on
wealth surveys and the perpetual inventory method, and we construct new PIM estimates for
the total economy and manufacturing. Following Maddison (1995) we apply historical series
for investment using assumptions concerning asset lives and depreciation patterns that are
standardised across countries. In this way we arrive at an internationally consistent series of
the capital stock for both countries beginning in the 1950s.
Section 3 of the paper analyses the measurement of capital input as a contributor to growth.
The results from two alternative growth accounting procedures, one measuring aggregate
capital input as a stock (stock-approach) and the other measuring capital service flows by
weighting structures and machinery at their user cost of capital (flow-approach), are
compared. We show that in periods with rapid change in the composition of the capital stock,
the difference between the two methods can be substantial.
                                           
1
 As this paper concentrates on two countries, we prefer to make use of methods that exploit the data to
a greater extent and improve international comparability. Hence we refrain from using either the World
Bank or Penn World Table data in the remainder of this paper.
2
 In the remainder of this paper we refer to these two countries as South Korea and Taiwan.
4Section 4 relates changes in capital-output ratios to changes in the levels of capital-labour
ratios (capital intensity) and output-labour ratios (labour productivity). This allows us to
analyse both the development of the returns to capital and the remaining potential for a catch-
up of capital intensity and labour productivity relative to the level of the United States, which
is the productivity leader in the world economy.
The estimates in this paper will be for the total economy as well as for the manufacturing
sector. The debate on the role of capital accumulation in growth often ignores the crucial
differences concerning these relations at the sectoral level vis-à-vis the total economy level.
In particular the manufacturing sector is likely to show different patterns, as the process of
capital intensification was of greater importance than in other sectors of the economy.
2. Estimating the Non-residential Capital Stock
Because a world wide standardisation of the measurement of physical capital is still lacking,
international comparisons of capital stock are fraught with problems.3 Capital stock estimates
are sometimes based on wealth surveys (see below), but more often on the perpetual
inventory method (PIM).
The perpetual inventory method
The perpetual inventory method, which was pioneered by Goldsmith (1951), estimates the
capital stock as the sum of past real investments which have survived up to the current
period. This method requires assumptions with regard to service lives and retirement patterns
of capital stock assets. In this paper we compile estimates of the gross fixed capital stock for
the total economy and for manufacturing, assuming that assets are discarded in one stroke after
their service lifetime. It is also assumed that repair and maintenance will keep the physical
production capabilities of an asset constant during its lifetime. This is known as the one-hoss-
shay efficiency pattern or rectangular retirement.4 Hence the stock of asset type i at time t (Kit)
is given by:
∑
+−
=
t
1dt
itit
i
IK (1)
with Iit investment at constant prices in asset type i at time t and di the service lifetime of asset i.
Use of equation (1) gives gross fixed capital stock estimates which include depreciation as
defined in the national accounts. Depreciation as reported by firms is largely determined by
accounting and tax conventions and much less so by the actual decline in productive capacity
                                           
3
 In this paper we concentrate on the non-residential capital stock, i.e. non-residential buildings, and
other construction (except land improvement), machinery and equipment and transport equipment.
4
 Different types of efficiency patterns such as geometric decline or straight-line depreciation are
discussed for OECD countries by, among others, Ward (1976), Blades (1993) and O’Mahony (1996).
5of the capital stock. Instead we assume that the productive capacity of each asset is constant
until it is scrapped at the end of its lifetime.
An important problem in comparing perpetual inventory estimates of the capital stock across
countries is that not only the depreciation patterns, but in particular the assumptions
concerning the asset lives can differ substantially. For example, even within the OECD, asset
lives for non-residential structures vary between 39 years in the United States, 57 years in
Germany and 66 years in the United Kingdom (Maddison, 1995). Some of these differences
may be ‘true’ differences as, among other reasons, an accelerated GDP growth can speed up
the replacement of new for old assets. However, the observed differences cannot be directly
related to this. Hence as a second-best approach (until internationally comparable asset lives
are available) one might calculate the stock on the basis of standardised asset lives across
countries. The standardisation method was pioneered by Maddison (1995) for total economy
estimates for France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UK and the USA, and was replicated for
manufacturing in Germany, Japan and USA by Van Ark and Pilat (1993) and for other
sectors of the economy in France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA by O’Mahony
(1996). Hofman (1998) applied the standardisation procedure to six Latin American
countries.
Standardised capital stock estimates for South Korea and Taiwan
The capital stock estimates for South Korea and Taiwan in this paper are based on the
standardised perpetual inventory method described above. Estimates for the total economy
are provided from 1951 (Taiwan) or 1953 (South Korea) to 1995, and for manufacturing from
1960 to 1993. In general the method involves the following data requirements: gross investment
series at current prices, price indices to revalue investment to constant base year replacement
costs, asset service lifetimes or rates of actual depreciation, and a benchmark capital stock
figure. The estimates and sources are presented in Appendix 1. Below we summarise the main
elements of our procedures.
South Korea, total economy
For the period 1953-1995 two series on capital formation were obtained from the Korean
national accounts, namely one for non-residential buildings and other construction (except
land improvement) and one for transport equipment and machinery and equipment. For the
period 1914-1938, we obtained total gross capital formation figures from Mizoguchi and
Umemura (1988). To bridge the period 1938-1953, we estimated capital formation on the
basis of output series assuming investment-output ratios at 0.10 for the period 1939-1944, at
0.00 for 1945 and 1946, at 0.05 for 1947-1950 and at 0.00 for 1951 and 1952. After linking,
the investment series was expressed in 1990 Won. As the pre-1953 figures were not divided
into series for non-residential structures and machinery and equipment, we roughly estimated
these shares on the basis of the Japanese investment figures (from Maddison, 1995) which we
lagged about 20 years: this implied that we assumed that the share for non-residential
structures fell from 65 per cent between 1914 and 1920, to 60 per cent between 1921 and
1930 and 55 per cent between 1931 and 1952. Next we applied the perpetual inventory
method, by using the standardised asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years for
6equipment from Maddison (1995). Moreover we discounted all pre-1953 investment by 40
per cent to account for war damage (Maddison, 1998, Table 3.10, p. 66). The first cumulated
benchmark estimate is provided for 1953. The estimates are adjusted from end-year to mid-
year basis.
Taiwan, total economy
The procedure for the estimation of the capital stock of the Taiwanese economy was similar
to that used for South Korea. For the period 1951-1995 two series on capital formation were
obtained from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGAS) for non-
residential structures and for plant and equipment. For the period 1912-1938, we obtained
total gross capital formation figures from Mizoguchi (1997). To bridge the period 1938-1951,
we estimated capital formation on the basis of output series assuming investment-output
ratios at 0.10 for the period 1939-1944, at 0.00 for 1945 and 1946 and at 0.05 for 1947-1950.
After linking, the whole investment series was expressed in 1991 Taiwanese dollars. As the
pre-1951 figures were not divided into series for non-residential structures and machinery and
equipment, we used the same share estimates as for the Korean investment figures (see
above). Next we applied the perpetual inventory method, by using the standardised asset lives
of 39 years for structures and 14 years for equipment from Maddison (1995). We also
discounted all pre-1947 investment by 40 per cent for war damage (Maddison, 1998, Table
3.10, p. 66). The first cumulated benchmark estimate could be provided for 1951. The
estimates were adjusted from end-year to mid-year basis.
South Korea and Taiwan, manufacturing
For manufacturing only one series for total capital formation (but excluding residential
structures) could be obtained from the national accounts. To obtain an average standardised
asset life for the whole investment series, we used the average asset lives for a number of
OECD countries from van Ark and Pilat (1993, p.42), namely 45 years for investment in non-
residential structures and 17 years for investment in equipment and vehicles. These asset life
estimates were then weighted by the share in gross fixed capital formation for Taiwan in
1987, which provided an average lifetime of 25 years.5 Investment series for manufacturing
go back to 1953 for South Korea and 1951 for Taiwan. We obtained investment series for the
pre-1953 (Korea) and pre-1951 (Taiwan) period using the trend in capital formation for the
total economy in both countries together with the 40 per cent-war damage adjustment.6
The Sensitivity of the Capital Stock Estimates
Clearly the standardisation procedure may be sensitive for the various assumptions involved. In
particular the assumptions concerning asset life times may affect the results. For example, one
                                           
5
 The share in gross fixed capital formation in Taiwanese manufacturing is 31 per cent  for structures
and 69 per cent  for equipment in 1987 (MOEA (1987) Annual Report on the Corporated Enterprises
Survey, Taiwan Area, ROC, No. 19, Table 2-4).
6
 This procedure slightly differs from that used in Timmer (1999) where the pre-1953 & 1951 series
were derived from the average growth rates from 1951 to 1956 (for Taiwan) and 1953 to 1957 (for
South Korea).
7might argue that asset lifetimes in rapidly growing Asian countries are likely to be shorter
than those in more slowly growing OECD economies because of higher investment rates and
a more rapid turnover of firms due to the continuing process of introducing new technologies
from more advanced countries (industrial upgrading).
To test this proposition we recalculated the standardised estimates for the total economy and
manufacturing in South Korea and Taiwan using alternative asset life assumptions.7
Table 1: Capital stock estimates using alternative lifetimes,
total economy and manufacturing, 1987 (as per cent of preferred estimate)
Alternative lifetime assumptions
Total Economy 18+5
years
22+6
years
30+10
years
39+14
years
45+19
years(a)
South Korea 73 79 94 100 104
Taiwan 65 72 89 100 107
Manufacturing 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
South Korea 77 92 97 100 101
Taiwan 64 86 96 100 101
(a) for Korea: 42 years for non-residential structure and 19 years for plant and equipment.
Source: PIM estimates with rectangular retirement patterns, war-damage adjustment (for
total economy) and alternative lifetimes for total non-residential fixed capital using
investment series from Appendix 1, compared with the preferred estimates discussed in
main text.
The overall conclusion from the table is that small variations in lifetimes have a limited
impact on the capital-stock estimates for the Asian countries. If the assumed asset lifetime for
South Korea and Taiwan is reduced to 30 years for structures and 10 years for plant and
equipment, the total economy stock in 1987 declines with 6 and 11 per cent respectively. The
effects for manufacturing are even smaller because the faster growth of investment compared
to the total economy reduces the impact of changes in asset lives. Further study on
international differences in asset lifetimes is called for, but in the remainder of this paper we
use our preferred estimates.
Comparison of the Results with Previous Estimates
For both South Korea and Taiwan capital stock estimates exist, based on a mix of national
wealth surveys and the perpetual inventory method. In a series of papers, Pyo (1988, 1992,
1998) provides estimates of gross fixed capital stock in South Korea based on wealth surveys
in 1968, 1977 and 1987, linked with investment from the national accounts. For linking
between benchmark years Pyo uses the polynomial-benchmark method. For the period before
the first and after the last benchmark year a perpetual inventory method is applied as
described above. Pyo’s method assumes that the benchmark estimates from the wealth
surveys are the best available estimates. An important advantage of this method is that
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 Variations in retirement patterns have only small effects. Similarly, variations in initial year estimates
have also little influence as by far the biggest part of investment in these dynamic economies has been
made in the last decades. See O’Mahony (1996) for a sensitivity analysis on capital stock estimates for
OECD countries.
8depreciation of the assets can be directly calculated from the model.8 In his earlier work Pyo
estimated gross and net capital stocks independently. In his latest study he first estimates net
capital stocks, which are converted to gross stocks using interpolated net-gross conversion
ratios from the wealth surveys (Pyo, 1998). This revision leads to a downward adjustment of
the results, especially before 1968. Kim and Hong (1997) also base their estimates on wealth
survey data, but use only the survey of 1987 as they consider that one to be more reliable than
the earlier surveys.9
Official capital stock estimates for Taiwanese manufacturing are provided by the Directorate
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), which uses the benchmark
extrapolation method (DGBAS 1994). However, the series are not fully comparable as capital
formation in agriculture is excluded in the estimates by DGBAS.10 Liang and Jorgenson
(1995) used a similar method for calculating the stock of various asset types as they "adjust
the time series data of capital stock by employing the National Wealth Censor (1988)".
Tables 2 and 3 compares the value of the capital stock according to our standardised
estimates derived from the perpetual inventory method with those from Pyo and DGBAS
respectively. In all cases our estimates are lower than the estimates based on the wealth
surveys. The gap in the early years is particularly large for Taiwan, and especially for
manufacturing. However, the gap between the DGBAS estimates and our figures becomes
much smaller over time, which implies that our estimates show more rapid capital
accumulation than the wealth based estimates. For South Korea, the gap between Pyo’s and
our estimates is slightly increasing over time.
Both because of reporting errors and theoretical differences, the PIM estimates will
inevitably differ from the wealth survey results. There are two main limitations of the PIM
method (Pyo, 1998). The first is the need for long historical investment series. In this paper,
we show that this limitation can be overcome using historical national accounts studies. A
second limitation is the need to assume particular asset lifetimes. Lifetimes may differ across
countries and over time, and further research is needed here. By using standardised asset lives
as in this paper, international comparability is enhanced. The estimation procedure is
transparent and it is possible to check the sensitivity of the results. Although wealth surveys
have the advantage that they measure the assets actual in use, when extrapolating the
benchmark stock to obtain a time series assumptions concerning retirements have to be made
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 See Pyo (1988) for a discussion of the methods.
9
 Pyo (1998) provides a comparison of his old and new estimates in Table 12. Note that the pre-1977
figures given in this table for Pyo (1992) are based on erroneously aggregated figures in the original
publication (see Pyo 1992, Table A2). He also shows that the results of Kim and Hong (1997) lead to
very high estimates of the capital stock in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1962, their estimate of the gross
stock  is 3.5 times higher than his and five times higher than our estimate. See Table 2.
10
 It is not clear whether residential buildings are included in the DGBAS estimates. As they are based
on a wealth survey amongst firms, probably part of the residential buildings stock will be included.
9as well. The actual nature of the survey is crucial for its usefulness for capital stock
measurement (Ward, 1976). Ideally, the survey should be a survey of physical assets on a
case by case basis and it should have a complete coverage, but such surveys are complicated
and prone to measurement errors. If instead the survey is based on book values, as often
reported in censuses, its use is much more circumspect. Balance sheets valuations reflect a
cumulation of historical prices of different time periods, they depend on the depreciation
accounting practices of firms which are mainly influenced by tax conventions rather than the
actual decline in productive capacity, and the vintage composition of the stock is unknown.
Even though the Korean wealth survey comes close to a survey of physical assets (Pyo 1998,
p.19), the official Taiwanese capital stock figures seem to be based on balance sheets.11
Another important shortcoming of using wealth surveys is the problem of obtaining
consistent methods of evaluation both across countries and over time (Ward, 1976).
Therefore we prefer to use our internationally consistent estimates based on the PIM
method.12
Table 2: Capital Stock in South Korea according to this Study and Pyo (1998)
Total Economy and Manufacturing, 1953-1996
Total Economy Manufacturing
This Study Pyo (1998) This study/ This Study Pyo (1998) This study/
Pyo (1998) Pyo (1998)
bln. 1990 Won (%) bln. 1990 Won (%)
    1953 9,502 11,241 0.85
    1963 13,263 19,518 0.68 3,006 3,848 0.78
    1973 46,205 55,256 0.84 9,991 14,673 0.68
    1985 224,494 297,191 0.76 62,985 102,137 0.62
    1996 736,682 980,149 0.75 262,177 404,847 0.65
annual compound growth
rate (%)
annual compound growth
rate (%)
 1953-63          3.3         5.5
 1963-73        12.5       10.4 12.0 13.4
 1973-85        13.2       14.0 15.3 16.2
 1985-96          9.1         9.2 11.0 12.5
Note: all growth rates in this paper are exponential rates.
Source: South Korea PIM based on investment series in National Accounts and (for total economy)
from Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988), with assumptions as explained in text. Survey estimate taken
from Pyo (1998), Table A4.
                                           
11
 Comparison with the Taiwanese production census data suggests that the census is used as a
benchmark. According to DGBAS, Report on the Industrial and Commercial Census in Taiwan-Fukien
district of the ROC 1991, Table 10, the total gross value of fixed assets in the manufacturing sector in
use in 1991, excluding land, was 3,544 billion NT$ (in 1986 prices) which is almost identical to the
3,537 billion NT$ given in DGBAS (1994).
12
 All growth rates in this paper are exponential rates.
10
Table 3: Capital Stock in Taiwan according to this Study and DGBAS (1994)
Total Economy and Manufacturing, 1951-1996
Total Economy Manufacturing
This Study DGBAS This study/ This Study DGBAS This study/
(1994) DGBAS (1994) DGBAS
bln. 1991 Taiw. $ (%) bln. 1991 Taiw. $ (%)
    1951 175,984
    1963 381,578 587,740 0.65 77,514 276,421 0.28
    1973 1,342,357 1,515,804 0.89 452,605 701,416 0.65
    1985 5,305,229 5,666,234 0.94 1,881,825 2,157,588 0.87
    1996 13,290,618 4,759,042
annual compound growth
rate (%)
annual compound growth
rate (%)
 1951-63         6.4
 1963-73       10.5       7.9        17.6         9.3
 1973-85       11.5     11.0        11.9         9.4
 1985-96         7.7          7.1
Note: DGBAS (1994) excludes capital in the agricultural sector of the economy.
Source: Taiwanese PIM based on investment series in DGBAS, National Income in Taiwan Area,
and (for total economy) from Mizoguchi (1997), with assumptions as explained in text. Survey
estimate taken from DGBAS (1994).
3. Capital Stock, Capital Services and Growth Accounting
The capital stock estimates presented in the previous section can be used in a growth
accounting exercise as introduced by Solow (1957) and developed further, along somewhat
different lines, by Denison (1967) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). Growth accounting
decomposes the growth of output (Y) into the contributions of the growth of inputs (X =
labour, capital, etc.) and a residual, which may be called total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. This residual can be defined as the difference between output and a weighted average
of input growth according to the following formula:
j
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j
t
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t
t
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A 111 lnlnln +++ ∑−= (2)
with jw   the weight of input j. Here we consider only labour and capital input.
The contribution of capital input to growth can be measured by the growth of the aggregate
capital stock, as obtained in the previous section, weighted at the share of capital income in
total output . However, by disaggregating the capital stock into various assets and weighting
those at the user cost of capital, one obtains the flow of capital services from the installed
capital stock. This flow approach takes account of the differences in capital services
delivered by the various types of capital assets (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967). A dollar
11
invested in buildings will yield a lower annual revenue product than a dollar invested in
machinery. Typically, the share of machinery in the capital stock increases over time,
especially during a period of rapid industrialisation. Consequently, TFP growth rates will be
lower on the basis of the disaggregated flow approach to capital measurement using service
flows than on the basis of the aggregated stock approach.
In obtained capital service flows, we follow Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) and
assume that the growth of aggregate capital input (KT) is given by a weighted growth of
individual capital inputs (KTk) using a Tornqvist index where weights are given by the shares
of each asset type in the total value of property compensation
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v   with pk the rental price of asset type k.
The rental prices of the different asset types are difficult to observe in practice and need to be
estimated. Three approaches can be distinguished with an increasing degree of sophistication.
The simplist way to estimate the user cost of capital (i.e., the rental price of capital services
divided by the acquisition price) is by the depreciation rate (Ward, 1976, used in Timmer,
1999). This captures the idea that longer lived assets provide less services per year. More
sophisticated is the opportunity-cost approach in which the cost of capital is approximated by
a standard cost-of-capital formulation as follows (O’Mahony, 1999):
)( PPi
P
p
kk
k
k ∆−∆−∂+= (4)
with i the real interest rate, δk the depreciation rate, Pk the purchase price of asset type k and
P the average purchase price of all assets. The last term is included to represent capital gains.
The most elegant is the residual approach used in Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) in
which national accounts data on property compensation is used to estimate rental prices
internally. The value of the marginal product of aggregate capital is equated with realised
profits. The rate of return is estimated using the national accounting identity between total
value of capital services (rental price times asset quantity) and total property compensation.
When industry level data is available, this method allows for varying rates of returns across
industries. In their estimation Jorgenson and associates also take into account differences in
tax rates. The residual approach has been used by Liang and Jorgenson (1995) in their study
of Taiwanese growth, but as it puts high demands on data, it is not attempted in this multi-
country study. Instead, we apply the opportunity-cost approach. The main problem with the
12
opportunity-cost approach is to pick an appropriate real interest rate. Following O’Mahony
we set this figure uniformly at 5 per cent for both South Korea and Taiwan.13
From formula (3) it can inferred that if the stock of the various capital assets grow at similar
rates, the aggregate capital service flows will grow at the same rate as the aggregate capital
stock. Hence, the two approaches will only generate different results in the case of a change
in the asset composition of the aggregate capital stock. Figure 1 shows the compositional
change in the aggregate capital stock for these two asset types, as obtained from the previous
section.
Figure 1 Share of Non-Residential Structures and Machinery in Total Fixed Non-
Residential Capital Stock, South Korea and Taiwan, 1953-1997 (share in total stock)
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Source: Appendix Table I
It follows from Figure 1 that both in South Korea and Taiwan the asset composition of the
capital stock changed rapidly between 1950 and the mid 1970s. After an initial decrease in
the 1950s, the share of machinery gradually increased in the 1960s and 1970s from about 20
per cent to 50 per cent of the total non-residential fixed capital stock. Afterwards the share
remained stable. The use of the capital service approach will therefore be particularly
important for capital input estimates in the early period. Because of a higher depreciation
rate, machinery generally has a  higher rental price than buildings, and hence capital service
flows will grow faster than the aggregate capital stock in this period. This is confirmed by the
results presented in the first two columns of Table 4. The first column presents the growth
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 Negative rental prices arise when asset deflators are highly volatile. In such a case one can smooth
the price deflators over a number of years. We did this only for the case of Korea in 1961. In a next
version of the paper we will use more realistic estimates of the real interest rate, e.g. by using the
deflated corporate bond rate, but it has been shown that the results are not very sensitive to this choice.
See Oulton and O’Mahony (1994), Appendix G, for a discussion.
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rates according to the stock method and the second the growth rates based on the flow
method using the opportunity-cost approach to obtain rental prices. In both countries, capital
input growth using the latter method is higher, especially for the period 1963-73 in Taiwan,
and 1973-1985 in Korea.
To indicate the importance of this difference in capital input measurement for TFP growth
calculations, we present growth accounting results using both alternative capital input series
in Table 4. To maintain consistency between our estimation of capital input with that of
labour input, we adjusted the total number of working hours for labour quality. A labour
quality index, measuring educational attainments, was obtained from Lee and Kim (1997) for
Korea, and a similar index was constructed for Taiwan. For the weighting of the input series
we applied a variant of formula (2), which applies the average weights of the current and
previous years according to the following translog formula (Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni,
1987):
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j
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j
j
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ln ++
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with )vv(21v j 1tjtj 1t ++ +=  and vtj  the value share of input j in output at t. Here we consider
only labour and capital input.
Table 4: Alternative Capital Input Series and Their Effect on Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) Growth (average annual growth rates, %)
GDP Labour
input (b)
Capital
input
based on
aggregate
stock
Capital
input
based on
service
flows (a)
Capital
share in
value
added
TFP
using
capital
stock
TFP
using
capital
services
South Korea
1963-73 8.62 5.63 12.48 13.31 0.44 0.05 -0.32
1973-85 7.53 3.65 13.17 14.44 0.39 0.17 -0.35
1985-96 8.25 3.28 10.80 10.96 0.36 2.27 2.21
1963-96 8.10 4.13 12.17 12.94 0.39 0.83 0.51
Taiwan
1963-73 10.57 4.09 12.58 14.55 0.51 2.14 1.13
1973-85 7.65 2.95 11.45 11.88 0.51 0.38 0.16
1985-96 7.06 1.97 8.35 8.19 0.50 1.91 1.99
1963-96 8.34 2.97 10.76 11.46 0.51 1.42 1.07
Notes: (a) capital services based on changes in stock of two asset types: non-residential buildings and
machinery. See main text for methodology.
 (b) Labour input is based on hours worked, corrected for changes in labour quality based on changes in
educational attainment using the same method as for capital input as described in main text. Labour quality
index for Korea was taken from Lee and Kim (1997, Appendix I, series I). Labour quality index for Taiwan
was calculated by authors using same methodology and data from DGBAS, Yearbook of Manpower Survey
Statistics, 1993, Table 11 for 1978-1993 and from DGBAS, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area, 1993, Table
29 for 1963-1977. Quality change for 1993-97 based on average change during 1988-1993.
Sources: Employment and working hours from GGDC Total Economy Database. Capital stock and capital
services from Appendix 1. Capital share in value added for Korea from Pilat (1994, Annex Table I.7)
assuming no change after 1990. Capital share in value added for Taiwan from DGBAS (1994, Table 7)
assuming no change before 1978 and after 1993.
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The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 4. Obviously, TFP growth rates are
lower when using the faster growing capital service input series. During the period 1963-73,
TFP growth in Taiwan is estimated 1.0 percentage point lower when using capital service
input. For Korea, the small TFP growth rates for the period up to 1985 when using the stock
approach turn into negative TFP growth rates when using service flows. For the more recent
period the differences in TFP growth rates using either the stock or the flow estimates are
much smaller as the stocks of buildings and machinery tend to grow at the same pace. But
whatever measure is adopted it is clear that the TFP growth rate was increased since the mid
1980s compared to the earlier period.
Our results for Korea differ from previous growth accounting results as presented in Kim and
Hong (1997) and Pilat (1993). Both studies show much faster growth in TFP in the 1960s and
1970s. This is mainly explained by the difference in the growth rate of capital. Both use
capital stock data based on wealth surveys, and in addition they apply the stock approach to
calculate capital input growth. As discussed above, our capital input series which are based
on the PIM-method and use the flow-approach, show much faster growth and hence we find
lower TFP growth rates. Young (1995) uses a similar approach as ours, but he excludes the
agricultural sector from his analysis. His results for Korea and Taiwan are comparable to ours
as TFP growth clearly show an improvement in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. A similar
improvement in TFP growth for Taiwan is found by Liang and Jorgenson (1995, Table 8)
who take the gross-output approach to growth accounting and also account for changes in the
use of intermediate and energy inputs, apart from factor inputs.
It should be emphasized that the TFP calculations in this section are not meant to provide an
estimate of technological change. It is clear from the literature that technological change is at
least partly embodied in the inputs. In its most extreme form all technological change, as far
as it is captured by the investors in their returns, is embodied in the inputs. The TFP residual
then solely represents non-pecuniary spillovers (Jorgenson, 1995). Others, like Denison
(1967), would argue that after accounting for various residual factors, such as improved
resource allocation, economies of scale, etc., the final residual may represent advances in
knowledge, as a form of disembodied technological change.14
Abramovitz (1979) recognizes the importance of a catch-up potential in the residual which
can be realised through benefitting from the diffusion of technological and organisational
knowledge. Given what was said above, one must distinguish between two ways in which
potential for catch-up growth can be realized. One is through investment opportunities, that is
the realizing the potential for further investments, given the gap in capital intensity relative to
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 See also studies of this nature for Korea, in particular Kim and Park (1985), Pilat (1994) and Kim and Hong
(1997)
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the leading countries in the world. Another potential is found in closing the gap in (total
factor) productivity levels compared to the world technology leaders. This productivity gap
indicates the gains which can be made through further diffusion of (disembodied) technology
from the global frontier. In reality these two vehicles through which the catch-up potential is
realized strongly interact (Abramovitz, 1986, Ohkawa, 1993). But what is crucial here is that
in both cases we need to look not only at growth rates but also at levels in an internationally
comparative perspective. In the following section we will therefore look at capital-output
ratios converted at international prices, and at comparative levels of capital intensity and
labour productivity.
4. Diminishing Returns and Catch-Up Potential
This section looks at the pace of capital accumulation in relation to the change in labour input
and output.15 We first focus on changes in the capital-output ratios to analyse the issue of
diminishing returns to investment. Next, the issue is treated more in depth by relating capital
intensity and labour productivity trends and levels. The “catch-up” perspective is provided by
comparing developments  in South Korea and Taiwan with those in the USA.
Diminishing returns to investment?
As discussed in the introduction to this paper it has been suggested by various authors that in
recent decades capital accumulation in East Asia has been so rapid that decreasing returns are
likely to set in. To test this claim  we provide comparative trends in capital-output ratios in
international prices. Output and capital stock were converted to US dollars (prices of 1990) on
the basis of purchasing power parities for GDP and capital formation respectively.16 Figure 2
shows the changes in the capital-output ratio in the total economy. In the 1960s, South Korea
and Taiwan were characterised by particularly low capital-output levels compared to the USA
as stressed by Fukuda and Toya (1998). This indicates that capital was used in a highly
productive way. As the investment process accelerated in the following decades, the capital-
output ratio slowly converged towards the level of the USA. This reflects a change in the
economic structure towards more capital intensive production processes as is to be expected
during an industrialization phase. In 1995, the amount of capital used per unit of output is still
considerably lower in the East Asian countries than in the USA.
                                           
15
 Hence we refrain here from making further observations on the basis of total factor productivity,
because many of the differences in results depend on the growth accounting methodology adopted, as
described above.
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 GDP for the total economy was converted to 1990 US$ with “Geary-Khamis”-type purchasing power
parities which were obtained from Maddison (1995) for Korea (updated from 1980) and from Penn
World Tables (version 5.6; described in Summers and Heston, 1988) for Taiwan. For manufacturing
GDP we used binary PPPs based on unit value ratios from Pilat (1994) for South Korea and Timmer
(1999) for Taiwan. Capital stock was converted into 1990 US$ by using investment PPPs for 1990 for
Korea and Taiwan divided by the investment PPP for the USA from PWT 5.6. Hence the capital stocks
are all expressed at the same investment price.
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The relative changes in the capital-output ratio in manufacturing are rather different as shown
in Figure 3. In the early phase of industrialisation in the 1960s, capital-output ratios were
already high and comparable to those in the USA.17 This contradicts the suggestion by Fukuda
and Toya (1998) that the low capital-output ratios at the total economy level in East Asia are
mainly due to low levels in manufacturing. On the contrary, it appears that low capital-output
ratios in the non-manufacturing sectors must account for the lower total economy levels
relative to the USA.
When comparing the relative trends between the total economy and manufacturing, it should
be noted that all figures are converted to 1990 US dollars using PPPs. It is a stylised fact that
relative price levels of developing countries relative to the USA (or any other advanced
country) are higher in manufacturing than in non-manufacturing. Indeed, in 1987 the relative
price level (i.e. the purchasing power parity relative to the exchange rate) of South Korea vis-
à-vis the United States was 85 per cent for manufacturing output but only 58 per cent for the
total economy. For Taiwan the difference was smaller, i.e. a relative price level of 78 per cent
for manufacturing versus 61 per cent for the total economy (Timmer, 1999). Hence in
domestic prices the difference between capital-output ratios in the total economy and
manufacturing would be less, but still significant.
A particular interesting feature of Figure 3 is the development of the capital-output ratio in
South Korean manufacturing which first declined from a very high level in the 1960s,
reached a low  in the 1970s and increased afterwards, especially since the end of the 1980s.
In Taiwanese manufacturing the ratio steadily increased since the beginning of the 1960s
with a similar acceleration as South Korea during the 1980s. The difference between South
Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s is a reflection of the different industrial development paths.
In both countries investments were geared into labour-intensive exports, but at the same time
secondary import substitution and the establishment of heavy industries such as oil refining
and basic metals was pushed much more in South Korea than in Taiwan (Amsden, 1989;
Timmer, 1999).
The rapid increase in the capital-output ratio since the late 1980s in both countries suggests
that capital in the manufacturing sector  has been accumulated at increasingly faster rates
with little additional output growth. In 1995, the ratio is higher than in the USA in both
countries. This observation lends partial support to Krugman (1994) and Young (1995) who
argue that diminishing returns to capital will reduce further growth prospects in East Asia.
Still, from the beginning of the 1980s onwards, the manufacturing sector in South Korea and
especially in Taiwan underwent radical structural changes. Rising wages and increased
competition from other Asian low-cost producers caused the competitiveness in the labour-
intensive industries such as textiles and wearing apparel to dwindle rapidly. As a result,
manufacturing activities were quickly upgraded. TFP growth rates even improved mainly
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 When using the estimates by Pyo (1998), the ratio in South Korea would be even higher. This
provides further evidence in favour of our PIM-estimates.
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because of the slowdown in labour input growth. However, the rising capital-output ratios
suggest that this process of industrial upgrading did not translate into higher output growth
rates. On the contrary, as the capital intensification of the production process proceeded,
similar investment efforts generated less output growth than before when investments were in
more mature and labour-intensive technologies.
Figure 2 Capital-Output Ratios in 1990 US$,
Total Economy South-Korea, Taiwan and USA, 1963-1996
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The remaining potential for catch up
To fully assess the impact on the growth potential of the Korean and Taiwanese economy we
need to look not only at the relation between capital and output, but also take labour input
into account. Initially, investments were coupled with a rapid increase in the labour force, but
during the 1980s the growth of the labour force stagnated, especially in manufacturing.
Table 5 shows the non-residential capital stock per hour worked in South Korea, Taiwan and
the United States. The table confirms the extraordinary rapid growth of capital intensity in
Korea and Taiwan, in particular since the early 1970s both in manufacturing and the total
economy. Before 1973 capital intensity grew more slowly in particular in Korea. However, it
should be recognised that in 1963 Korean capital intensity in manufacturing was already 50
per cent higher than in Taiwan (see also above). Despite the rapid growth in capital-labour
ratios, the gap in capital intensity relative to the United States was still huge by 1993. For the
total economy capital-labour ratios were around 25 per cent of the US level in 1993. For
manufacturing relative capital intensity was somewhat higher but still left a gap of about 60
per cent in both countries compared to the United States.18 This indicates that also within
manufacturing, relative labour intensive activities still dominate production. This is also true
at a lower level of aggregation. Timmer (1999) found large gaps in capital intensity between
the East-Asian countries and the USA in all 2-digit manufacturing industries, except textiles.
To analyse the issue of diminishing returns comprehensively, we need to look not only at the
capital-labour ratios but also at the labour productivity ratios relative to the United States.
Table 6 shows the level of value added per hour worked in South Korea, Taiwan and the
United States for the total economy and manufacturing. It is clear that the rapid growth in
capital intensity is reflected in rapid labour productivity growth. It appears that despite the
lower level of capital intensity for the total economy, the labour productivity level for the
total economy has been substantially higher than in manufacturing. This implies that non-
manufacturing sectors create higher productivity levels with lower capital intensity. This
again points at the different relative output price levels in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors dicussed above. Even though in domestic prices manufacturing tends
to create more output per working hour with more capital per working hour, in international
prices, non-manufacturing sectors create more output per working hour even with less capital.
Figures 4 and 5 show the relation between the non-residential capital stock per hour worked
and GDP per hour worked in 1990$ for the total economy and manufacturing respectively in
a graphical format. The figures clearly show the rapid catching up with the USA but also
indicate the remaining potential for further growth in East Asia through narrowing the two
mentioned gaps: one through increased capital intensity and another one through a rise in
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 The levels of capital intensity in South Korean manufacturing differ substantially from those
presented in Timmer (1999). This is due to the differences in the labour series used. Here we used
employment series from the national accounts which are about 50 per cent higher than those found in
the manufacturing census which were used by Timmer (1999). Further investigation into these
differences is warranted.
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productivity. For the total economy the gap in capital intensity is especially large. In
manufacturing the gap in labour productivity seems to be relatively large. With the same
amount of capital per hour worked, the United States generated much more output in the
1960s than the East-Asian countries in the 1990s. The concave nature of the growth paths
indicates an increasing capital-output ratio with diminishing returns as in the traditional
growth model of Solow (1956).
Table 5: Capital per Hour Worked in Total Economy and Manufacturing, 1963-1993,
South Korea, Taiwan and USA,  in 1990 US$ and average  per cent  growth rate
South Korea Taiwan United States
Total Manufac- Total Manufac- Total Manufac-
Economy Turing Economy turing Economy Turing
1990 US$ 1990 US$ 1990 US$
1963 1.19 2.73 1.37 1.80 41.31 25.17
1973 2.63 3.29 3.43 4.39 49.92 33.13
1985 8.90 9.96 10.68 11.33 63.54 51.01
1996 20.06 33.48 23.00 30.19 69.94 65.42
average (%) growth-rate average (%) growth-rate average (%) growth-rate
1963-73 7.9 1.9 9.2 8.9 1.9 2.7
1973-85 10.2 9.2 9.5 7.9 2.0 3.6
1983-96 7.4 11.0 7.0 8.9 1.0 2.3
Source: Capital stock from Tables 2 and 3. Converted to 1990 US$ on the basis of purchasing
power parities for investment calculated from Penn World Tables, Version 5.6. Employment
from national accounts: South Korea from EPB, Annual Report on the Economically Active
Population; Taiwan from DGBAS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China and Monthly
Bulletin of Manpower Statistics. United States from BEA, National Income and Product
Accounts of the United States. Working hours for total economy from GGDC Total Economy
Database and for manufacturing from Pilat (1994) for Korea and USA, and from DGBAS,
Monthly Bulletin of Earnings and Productivity for Taiwan.
Table 6: Value Added (at factor cost) per Hour Worked in Total Economy and Manufacturing,
1963-1993, South Korea, Taiwan and USA,  in 1990 US$ and average  per cent  growth rate
South Korea Taiwan United States
Total Manufac- Total Manufac- Total Manufac-
Economy Turing Economy turing Economy Turing
1990 US$ 1990 US$ 1990 US$
1963 2.24 0.83 1.90 1.23 18.52 14.19
1973 3.56 1.76 3.89 2.85 23.60 19.10
1985 6.07 3.56 7.45 5.00 27.33 24.19
1996 10.34 8.46 14.12 9.78 30.64 32.91
average (%) growth-rate average (%) growth-rate average (%) growth-rate
1963-73 4.7 7.6 7.2 8.4 2.4 3.0
1973-85 4.4 5.8 5.4 4.7 1.2 2.0
1983-96 4.8 7.9 5.8 6.1 1.0 2.8
Source: Output from Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea 1975, and National Accounts, various
issues linked with OECD, National Account Statistics, 1997.; Taiwan from DGBAS, National Income in
Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1994; United States from BEA, National Income and Product
Accounts of the United States. Converted to 1990 US$ on the basis of 1990 Geary Khamis
purchasing power parities from Maddison (1995) for total economy. For manufacturing on the
basis of unit value ratios from Pilat (1994) for South Korea and from Timmer (1999) for Taiwan.
Employment and hours as for Table 5.
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Figure 4  Labour Productivity and Capital Intensity, Total Economy, 1990
US$
Figure 5  Labour Productivity and Capital Intensity, Manufacturing, 1990
US$
Nevertheless despite the rise in capital intensity, the findings suggest that continued growth
in East Asia on the basis of expansion of inputs is not ‘inevitably subject to diminishing
returns’ (Krugman, 1994, p.63). There remains substantial scope for further investment, but it
must be accompanied with measures that help to realise the potential of productivity
improvements through disembodied technical change.
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TFP growth in the previous decades might have been positive as found above, but the East
Asian countries apparently started to grow from rather low relative levels of productivity and
gaps with the USA still remain. The finding that gaps in capital intensity between the US and
the East-Asian countries are still large suggests that there is still ample scope for further
investment-driven growth, i.e. realising the remaining catch-up potential. At the same time,
there is further catch up potential through improvements in productivity levels which,
although they grew rapidly in the previous decades, are still far lagging behind the US levels.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we first reconstructed the non-residential capital stock of South Korea and
Taiwan based on long-term series of investment in non-residential buildings and machinery
and equipment. Secondly, we looked at the impact of various capital input measures on total
factor productivity growth. Finally, to assess the potential for continued catch-up of the
emerging economies towards productivity levels of the more advanced countries, we analysed
capital-output ratios and  the change comparative levels of capital intensity and labour
productivity.
For both countries we find a rapid growth of the capital stock for the total economy and for
manufacturing, with growth rates that peaked between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. In
terms of capital per hour worked, the growth trend has continued to accelerate since the mid
1980s as employment growth slowed down. In particular with capital inputs measured in
terms of service flows, total factor productivity growth is low up to the mid 1980s, but since
then shows some improvement. With respect to the capital-output ratios we find a continuous
rise over time for the total economy, and for manufacturing we found a strong rise in capital-
output ratios in particular since the 1980s. At the same time  there are still large gaps between
the two East Asian countries and the USA in terms of capital-labour ratios and labour
productivity. This indicates that despite the diminishing returns to capital goods, especially in
manufacturing, opportunities for further growth on basis of accumulation are still far from
exhausted.
Given the rise in capital-output ratios, the remaining catch-up potential needs to be realised
by complementing capital accumulation with changes in the industrial stucture, introduction
of new technologies and improvements in credit allocation mechanisms. This need is
reinforced by the effects of the currency crisis in 1997 and 1998. Among other things, foreign
direct investment can also play an important role in this process by augmenting the domestic
investment effort and through associated technology spillovers.
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Appendix Table 1.1 Nonresidential Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Nonresidential
Gross Fixed Capital Stock in South Korea, Total Economy
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Gross Fixed Capital Stock GFCS
(GFCF), bln. 1990 Won (GFCS), mln. 1990 Won in 1990
Structures Equipment Total Structures Equipment Total mln. US$
1914 129
1915 110
1916 118
1917 146
1918 188
1919 174
1920 134
1921 152
1922 180
1923 183
1924 147
1925 130
1926 189
1927 260
1928 303
1929 330
1930 327
1931 258
1932 304
1933 327
1934 427
1935 560
1936 740
1937 688
1938 833
1939 580 475 1055
1940 650 532 1182
1941 659 539 1198
1942 655 536 1191
1943 665 544 1209
1944 636 520 1156
1945 0 0 0
1946 0 0 0
1947 186 152 338
1948 200 164 364
1949 215 176 391
1950 231 189 421
1951 0 0 0
1952 0 0 0
1953 266 88 354 7304 2198 9502 14620
1954 280 125 405 7505 2003 9508 14630
1955 369 158 527 7762 1823 9584 14747
1956 317 218 535 8025 1688 9714 14947
1957 420 231 651 8294 1589 9883 15206
1958 432 212 644 8611 1491 10102 15544
1959 497 189 686 8983 1536 10519 16185
1960 415 217 632 9354 1738 11092 17067
1961 523 229 752 9723 1916 11639 17908
1962 706 303 1009 10228 2088 12316 18951
26
1963 887 399 1286 10926 2337 13263 20407
1964 861 306 1167 11717 2579 14296 21998
1965 1135 379 1514 12620 2865 15484 23826
1966 1400 802 2203 13753 3455 17208 26478
1967 1640 1059 2699 15104 4342 19446 29921
1968 2303 1384 3687 16886 5457 22343 34378
1969 3272 1678 4950 19476 6846 26323 40502
1970 3309 1604 4913 22591 8299 30891 47531
1971 3197 1974 5171 25676 9864 35540 54685
1972 3304 2199 5503 28737 11729 40466 62264
1973 4178 2652 6830 32251 13954 46205 71095
1974 3968 3181 7149 36028 16667 52695 81082
1975 4443 3484 7927 39843 19777 59620 91737
1976 5307 4717 10024 44289 23611 67901 104478
1977 6616 6312 12928 49794 28775 78570 120894
1978 7789 9387 17176 56573 36273 92846 142861
1979 8846 10875 19720 64521 46061 110583 170153
1980 8725 8859 17584 72914 55338 128252 197340
1981 8639 8900 17539 81202 63287 144488 222323
1982 9977 8937 18914 90113 70984 161097 247880
1983 11936 9695 21631 100680 78769 179448 276116
1984 13497 11312 24808 113205 87631 200836 309025
1985 14225 11860 26085 127066 97428 224494 345427
1986 13934 14677 28611 141090 108609 249699 384210
1987 16467 17483 33950 156175 122264 278438 428431
1988 18301 19766 38067 173434 137971 311406 479158
1989 21147 22567 43713 193024 155805 348829 536741
1990 25028 26845 51873 216042 176410 392452 603863
1991 28284 30088 58372 242698 199361 442059 680193
1992 29102 29767 58868 271257 221439 492696 758109
1993 31419 29722 61140 301244 241052 542297 834428
1994 33650 36726 70376 333454 264409 597863 919929
1995 36613 42521 79134 368243 295153 663396 1020762
1996 39917 46094 86013 406140 330541 736682
Sources and notes: Total gross capital formation (excluding residential and land improvement) for 1914-1938
Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988), and for 1953-1996 from Bank of Korea, National Accounts (various issues).
Capital formation from 1938-1953 on the basis of output series assuming investment-output ratios at 0.10 for the
period 1939-1944, at 0.00 for 1945 and 1946, at 0.05 for 1947-1950 and at 0.00 for 1951 and 1952. Output
from A. Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (OECD Development Centre). After
linking, the whole investment series was expressed in 1990 Won. Pre-1953 figures were divided into series for
nonresidential structures and machinery and equipment on the basis of shares derived from Japanese investment
figures (from Maddison, 1995) which we lagged about 20 years, i.e. 65 per cent for structures between 1914 and
1920, 60 per cent for structures between 1921 and 1930 and 55 per cent between 1931 and 1952. Moreover we
discounted all pre-1953 investment by 40 per cent  for war damage (Maddison, 1998, Table 3.10, p.
66).Investment was accumulated by using the standardized asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years for
equipment from Maddison (1995). Stocks adjusted to mid-year. Estimates were converted to US dollars on the
basis of PPPs for investment obtained from Penn World Tables 5.3 (see Summers and Heston, 1991).
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Appendix Table 1.2 Nonresidential Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Nonresidential
Gross Fixed Capital Stock in Taiwan, Total Economy
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Gross Fixed Capital Stock GFCS
(GFCF), mln. 1991 Taiw. $ (GFCS), mln. 1991 Taiw. $ in 1990
Structures Equipment Total Structures Equipment Total mln. US$
1912 2736
1913 2213
1914 1840
1915 1523
1916 1541
1917 2709
1918 2242
1919 3389
1920 5059
1921 4333
1922 3455
1923 3503
1924 2839
1925 3900
1926 3987
1927 4720
1928 5736
1929 6053
1930 5535
1931 4826
1932 5789
1933 6401
1934 7194
1935 9250
1936 9903
1937 7856 6428 14284
1938 8649 7077 15726
1939 9886 8089 17975
1940 9850 8059 17909
1941 10836 8866 19702
1942 11633 9518 21151
1943 7930 6489 14419
1944 5446 4456 9902
1945 0 0 0
1946 0 0 0
1947 3454 2826 6280
1948 3738 3058 6796
1949 4047 3311 7357
1950 4380 3584 7964
1951 7792 2787 10579 128352 47632 175984 6528
1952 9321 4168 13489 135423 47059 182482 6769
1953 12351 4986 17337 145043 47086 192129 7139
1954 12825 4897 17722 156622 47183 203806 7573
1955 11044 4322 15366 167638 46715 214353 7964
1956 11671 5946 17617 177720 46334 224054 8325
1957 10703 6372 17075 187422 47691 235113 8736
1958 13127 7744 20871 197648 51465 249113 9256
1959 15843 9388 25231 209598 58695 268293 9969
1960 19749 10355 30104 224577 68566 293143 10892
28
1961 20278 12242 32520 242254 78452 320706 11916
1962 23638 11329 34967 262125 87295 349420 12983
1963 26515 13008 39523 285299 96279 381578 14178
1964 30073 14974 45047 311571 106823 418394 15546
1965 31304 22995 54299 339893 122622 462515 17185
1966 36547 30824 67371 371207 146054 517261 19219
1967 44081 38318 82399 408384 176048 584432 21715
1968 52291 45986 98277 453033 213259 666292 24757
1969 56011 55132 111143 503708 259208 762916 28347
1970 56496 72503 128999 556853 317892 874744 32502
1971 59656 92513 152169 611744 394241 1005985 37378
1972 72219 110350 182569 674025 488614 1162639 43199
1973 75009 127148 202157 743560 598797 1342357 49877
1974 84038 148810 232848 818151 726905 1545055 57408
1975 120389 160979 281368 914618 870501 1785119 66328
1976 131862 157433 289295 1035416 1017921 2053337 76294
1977 150848 145160 296008 1171820 1157049 2328869 86531
1978 163419 167028 330447 1323392 1299152 2622544 97443
1979 173923 204165 378088 1486143 1465764 2951907 109681
1980 187713 251767 439480 1660755 1666821 3327575 123639
1981 184362 270769 455131 1840051 1893518 3733569 138724
1982 189111 269476 458587 2020919 2121488 4142407 153915
1983 185251 267302 452553 2204087 2339318 4543405 168815
1984 197364 267440 464804 2393760 2542872 4936632 183425
1985 207329 230077 437406 2596107 2709122 5305229 197121
1986 233927 261790 495717 2815008 2853624 5668632 210623
1987 254318 329511 583829 3055535 3030526 6086060 226133
1988 286300 384699 670999 3321952 3249652 6571603 244174
1989 313447 461939 775386 3617612 3518076 7135688 265133
1990 358767 501870 860637 3947633 3840775 7788407 289386
1991 423599 524055 947654 4330259 4202441 8532700 317041
1992 462473 607989 1070462 4762459 4612369 9374828 348331
1993 512689 626672 1139361 5237452 5044103 10281555 382021
1994 569017 654288 1223305 5766371 5456617 11222987 417001
1995 599281 719587 1318868 6339162 5882286 12221448 454100
1996 608070 774021 1216139 6931650 6358968 13290618 493826
Sources and notes: Total gross capital formation (excluding residential and land improvement) for 1912-1938
Mizoguchi (1997), and for 1951-1995 from DGBAS, National Income in the Taiwan Area of the Republic of
China (various issues). Capital formation from 1938-1951 on the basis of output series assuming investment-
output ratios at 0.10 for the period 1939-1944, at 0.00 for 1945 and 1946 and 0.05 for 1947-1950. Output from
A. Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (OECD Development Centre). After linking,
the whole investment series was expressed in 1991 Taiwanese dollars. Pre-1951 figures were divided into series
for nonresidential structures and machinery and equipment on the basis of shares derived from Japanese
investment figures (from Maddison, 1995) which we lagged about 20 years, i.e. 65 per cent for structures
between 1914 and 1920, 60 per cent for structures between 1921 and 1930 and 55 per cent between 1931 and
1952. Investment was accumulated by using the standardized asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years
for equipment from Maddison (1995). Moreover we discounted all pre-1951 investment by 40 per cent  for war
damage (Maddison, 1998, Table 3.10, p. 66). Stocks adjusted to mid-year. Estimates were converted to US
dollars on the basis of PPPs for investment obtained from Penn World Tables 5.3 (see Summers and Heston,
1991).
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Appendix Table 1.3 Nonresidential Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Nonresidential
Gross Fixed Capital Stock in South Korea and Taiwan, Manufacturing
South Korea Taiwan
GFCF GFCS GFCS GFCF GFCS GFCS
in 1990 in 1990 in 1990 in 1991 in 1991 in 1990
bln. Won bln. Won mln. US$ mln. T. $ mln. T. $ mln. US$
1935 3345
1936 3581
1937 2841
1938 3128
1939 144 3575
1940 161 3562
1941 164 3918
1942 163 4207
1943 165 2868
1944 158 1969
1945 0 0
1946 0 0
1947 46 1249
1948 50 1352
1949 53 1463
1950 57 1584
1951 0 2104
1952 0 2209
1953 81 3760
1954 81 4083
1955 143 2434
1956 181 3699
1957 196 4079
1958 185 4667
1959 153 4762
1960 163 6537
1961 162 6853
1962 217 6677
1963 283 3005 4643 7943 77514       2,880
1964 279 3141 4852 12498 87867       3,265
1965 385 3364 5197 15144 100874       3,748
1966 656 3857 5958 19069 117592       4,369
1967 652 4346 6714 28999 144067       5,353
1968 875 5056 7810 34082 176428       6,555
1969 993 5891 9101 37386 212633       7,901
1970 821 6712 10370 48624 261257       9,707
1971 1062 7774 12010 51432 312689     11,618
1972 820 8548 13206 64697 376137     13,976
1973 1492 9991 15435 77820 452605     16,817
1974 1686 11624 17957 97851 548993     20,398
1975 2233 13799 21318 118325 665734     24,736
1976 3016 16815 25977 111002 774632     28,782
1977 4264 21079 32565 93332 865755     32,168
1978 5799 26797 41399 87114 949109     35,265
1979 6307 33024 51018 114742 1059768     39,377
1980 4497 37378 57745 143947 1201281     44,635
1981 4143 41341 63867 151978 1349560     50,144
1982 4295 45440 70200 128669 1474150     54,773
30
1983 4536 49791 76921 125661 1595144     59,269
1984 6158 55796 86199 159823 1750205     65,031
1985 7353 62985 97306 138157 1881825     69,921
1986 9084 71908 111090 187484 2062456     76,633
1987 12645 84335 130288 220953 2276732     84,594
1988 14418 98470 152125 243525 2512314     93,347
1989 16317 114507 176901 251988 2751804   102,246
1990 18932 133054 205554 252347 2989007   111,059
1991 19899 152296 235281 266761 3236699   120,263
1992 17618 169262 261492 294380 3502080   130,123
1993 16623 185010 285820 296212  3764210   139,863
1994 22022  206039 317030 334934 4061758   150,919
1995 27783   233000 358515 379819  4392953   163,224
1996 30239    262177 403409 417521  4759042   176,827
Sources and notes: Total gross capital formation (excluding residential and land
improvement) for 1953-1993 (Korea) from Bank of Korea, National Accounts (various
issues) and for 1951-1993 (Taiwan) from DGBAS, National Income in the Taiwan Area of
the Republic of China (various issues). Pre-1953/1951 estimates of capital formation were
obtained through linking with total economy series (see Appendix Tables 1.1 and 1.2). After
linking, the whole investment series was expressed in 1990 bln. Won and 1991 mln.
Taiwanese dollars. Investment was accumulated by using the standardized asset lives of 25
years for all nonresidential equipment, based on Van Ark and Pilat (1993). Moreover we
discounted all pre-1951 investment by 40 per cent for war damage (Maddison, 1998, Table
3.10, p. 66). Estimates were converted to US dollars on the basis of PPPs for investment
obtained from Penn World Tables 5.3 (see Summers and Heston, 1991).
